报告人：焦振华教授

报告时间：4月22日（星期六）上午9：00—10：30

腾讯会议：113-702-324

报告题目：Indivisible objects allocation: Fairness and efficiency

报告摘要：We study the indivisible objects allocation among a group of agents. Each agent is to receive exactly one object and there is no monetary transfers. This paper  shows the incompatibility between fairness and efficiency for deterministic allocation mechanisms. As a solution to the incompatibility problem, we propose a random assignment mechanism. We also investigate the axiomatic properties for the newly proposed mechanism.

报告人简介：焦振华，上海对外经贸大学国际经贸学院教授，上海财经大学经济学博士。先后在包括数学学报，Acta Mathematica Scientia, Differential Geometry and its Applications, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, Games and Economic Behavior, Economics Letters, Mathematical Social Sciences, Operations Research Letters, Social Choice and Welfare, Journal of Mathematical Economics等国内外学术期刊发表论文二十余篇。